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Purpose

***Provide Commander with a detailed view of the operational environment and force structure both in October 2007 and 31 July 2008, determine risks to achieving irreversible momentum, and recommend changes to mitigate that risk***


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Agenda







- ✧ **Intro**
  - Methodology
  - Background
  - Facts
  - Assumptions
- ✧ **Operational Environment: 1 October 2007 and 31 July 2008**
  - Threat Environment
  - Information Environment
  - Governance/ Economic Environment
  - Provincial Progress
  - ISF Capabilities
  - Force Lay-down
    - Basing
    - Coalition Troops
    - Enablers by War Fighting Function
  - Task Analysis
    - By Phase
    - By Region
- ✧ **Proposed Course of Action**
- ✧ **Operational Risk**
- ✧ **Commanding General Comments**

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


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Methodology

-  **PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFORMATION**
  - Force management overview
-  **ESTABLISH BASELINE FUTURE ENEMY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**
  - Describe future threat environment (July 2008)
-  **ESTABLISH BASELINE FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**
  - Describe future governmental, economic, ISF, etc. environment (July 2008)
-  **ESTABLISH BASELINE FRIENDLY FORCES DATA**
  - Account for all MNC-I forces (October 2007)
  - Account for all MNC-I forces in future set (July 2008)
-  **FUSE LAYERS OF FUTURE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT**
  - Identify potential risk
  - Prioritize risk
-  **PROPOSE MITIGATIONS**


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- Phasing construct acknowledges diverse conditions throughout the country
- Different parts in different phases
- Phases reflect the relationship between the security environment, ISF capability, and Coalition Force posture in a given area
- The general progression goes from high CF involvement in providing security in earlier phases, decreasing over time
- In Phase 2 – establishing security through a deliberate clear-control-retain approach in partnership with the Iraqis
- In Phase 3 – efforts to protect the population and neutralize threats to security continue – but under ISF lead; gradual shift in CF posture initiated at the end of Phase 2 continues; this re-posturing involves a “thinning of the line” that allows routine CF interaction with the population to diminish as the ISF assumes more responsibility for COIN operations
- In Phase 4 – ISF independent operations – with growing IP lead in population centers; further reduction in CF interaction with the populace and a noticeable decline in CF presence as forces consolidate on major FOBs
- In Phase 5 – All elements of the ISF performing their functions; full responsibility lies with the Iraqi civil authorities






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*Facts*

1. President stated in 13 SEP 2007 press release that forces in Iraq will decrease by 5,700 (1 BCT + MEU) before the end of the year
2. During congressional testimony GEN Petraeus stated that Iraq would return to "pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams," not troops
3. Many senators and representatives stated that GEN Petraeus planned to have 130K in ITO by 31 July 2008. This assertion was never made by GEN Petraeus, who defined the surge in numbers of BCTs, not personnel
4. Surge increase of 26,662 has been accompanied by a 4,781 increase in forces, both directly and indirectly related to the surge
5. Requests for an additional 3,200 forces are pending either submission or approval
6. During the surge, there were no enduring increases to sustainment forces
7. The JCS published MOD 6 to 1003V to re-posture forces in the CENTCOM AOR and set conditions for long-term security in Iraq
8. ISF Officer and NCO force generation capacity is extremely limited
9. CENTCOM FRAGO 09-1301 directs the reposture of US OIF forces from 20 to 15 BCTs
10. CENTCOM FRAGO 09-1301 directs that 2 USMC Infantry Battalions depart MNF-W without backfill by May 2008

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Assumptions 1 of 2

1. Iraq will face no serious conventional threat from a neighboring state
2. Main effort will remain security of the population of Baghdad
3. A constitutionally established Iraqi government will remain in power, but not achieve reconciliation or significant political/ economic development in the near term
4. Coalition will retain legal authority and GOI approval to conduct COIN, CT, and Force Protection operations under renewed UNSCR mandate or other negotiated agreement
5. Regional partners will continue existing support to coalition operations and basing
6. Inter-agency efforts to advance political and economic lines of operation will be sustained
7. All provinces (less Kirkuk – Art. 140 dependent) will be at PIC NLT Jul 08
8. MNF-I initially will realize a 500 military personnel reduction from its HQ and other subordinate units
9. CJSOTF and TF 1.4a will maintain same force levels
10. MP requirements will not decrease

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*Assumptions 2 of 2*

1. BCTs will deploy at 92% assigned strength
2. MNF-I and CENTCOM force levels (minus changes from estimated reductions and RFFs) will remain constant
3. There will be no increase in externally-sourced transition teams
4. CENTCOM will establish PTDO brigade equipment set by July 2008 in Kuwait
5. The UK will maintain a brigade sized force of ~2,500 or greater with a two-star headquarters in Southern Iraq through 2008
6. MND-CS and MND-NE HQs will remain in ITO at least through 2008
7. Georgia will contribute one BDE(-) to the Coalition until July 2008

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Environment


**Operational Environment**

**1 Oct 07 vs. 31 Jul 08**

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The threat environment in Iraq consists of four interacting conflicts: counter-occupation, terrorism, insurgency and a communal struggle for power and survival, occurring in the context of failing state and complicated by the external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian, and Arab civilizations.

Solving just one of these problems in isolation tends to make the others worse, so our solution set should be as complex as our problem set.

Counter-occupation is an implicit cultural norm that calls for Muslim populations to oppose non-Muslim forces on Muslim soil. This predisposes the Iraqi populace to at least passively support attacks against Coalition Forces and contributes to Iraqi youth vulnerability to recruitment by more violent elements.

Terrorism in Iraq is connected to Al Qaeda's global jihad that aims to create a virtual caliphate which is facilitated by regional terrorist and foreign fighter networks. The primary terrorist organizations in Iraq are the Sunni Extremist groups of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and to a lesser extent, Ansar Al Sunnah (AAS). Sunni Extremist brutal and excessive tactics such as the use of suicide bombers, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and targeting fellow Muslims have eroded its popular support base. Sunni Extremist terrorism overlaps with the Sunni Rejectionist insurgency. Their intermediate objectives of weakening the Shia-dominated government coincide. However, the Sunni Extremist objective of creating a failed state to serve as a terrorist sanctuary from which to launch a global jihad is mutually exclusive with the Sunni Rejectionist objective of re-establishing a Sunni-dominated Government of Iraq that is eventually at peace with its neighbors.

The insurgency in Iraq is an almost exclusively Sunni Rejectionist movement aimed at regaining former power and influence. The principal Sunni Rejectionist groups are the 1920s Revolutionary Brigades, the Islamic Army of Iraq, Jaysh al Mujahidin, and the more nationalistic elements of Ansar al Sunnah. The Sunni Rejectionist goal at restoring Sunni power is just one part of the ongoing communal struggle for power and survival.


The communal struggle for power and survival is occurring both between and among the various ethno-sectarian groups. The major Shia groups of SCIRI, Badr, OMS and Fadilah are working together to prevent the Sunni resurgence, but fight among themselves for Shia dominance. The primary Kurdish groups: the KDP and PUK are working to increase Kurd autonomy and extend the limits of Kurdistan where possible. The potential expansion of Kurdistan is opposed by both Sunni and Shia Arabs, as well as by minorities such as the Turkomen. Sunni tribes are banding together to fight AQI, but may pose a challenge to Sunni provincial and national politicians as the tribal influence grows.

The Gol's capacity to respond to the interacting conflicts is hindered by its current condition as a failing state. The



Gol is struggling to develop the governmental, ministerial and security capacity to deal with the threats that confront it. The external influences of Western, Turkish, Persian and Arab civilizations increase the complexity of Gol's situation and reduce the likelihood of solutions agreeable to all actors.

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**Sunni Rejectionists:  
Iraqi Hamas/1920RB/JAI/JM**

**Changes in context:**

- Longterm CF presence
- Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
- Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements





*From insurgency to inclusion*

**Rejectionist objectives:**

- Recruit members disillusion with extremist groups into rejectionist groups
- Merge disparate armed factions that are torn between targeting CF or AQI
- Organize united negotiating position
- Exploit former AQI members for intelligence and isolate NBP


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## The Sadrists and Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM)

**Changes in context:**

- Longterm CF presence
- Emboldened PM with more capable ISF
- Reassured and proliferating Tribal and Concerned Citizens Movements





*From emerging power to damage control*

**Sadrist/JAM objectives:**


- Stand-down and reorganize JAM to reverse the decline in popular support
- Conduct political maneuvers to reverse decline in influence and counter Party of Four
- Adjust counter-Occupation stance


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














Assissinations:





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## OE '08: Information Operations



### Possible Perceptions of the Iraqi Populace after US Draw-Down

<p><b>Negative:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▲ Less joint ops / less oversight of ISF (sectarian concerns)</li> <li>▲ Economic loss for Iraqis conducting business with CF</li> <li>▲ Anti-Gol forces (AQI, JAMAH) out lasted CF</li> <li>▲ CF lacks suitable strength to protect Iraqi populace</li> <li>▲ Kurds under greater pressure to resolve Kirkuk issue before CF depart completely</li> <li>▲ US Military succumbed to US political pressure / loss of popular support</li> <li>▲ <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 1.2em; vertical-align: middle;"></span></li> <li>▲ Sunni feel CF have abandoned them, not finished the job</li> <li>▲ Token withdrawal (CF still here); draw-down is a deception / conspiracy</li> </ul>	<p><b>Positive:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▲ Gol / ISF capabilities effective enough to take over</li> <li>▲ CF keeping to their word and leaving a sovereign Iraq</li> <li>▲ Iraqis are taking control of their lives and their country</li> <li>▲ CF can still help if the situation / Gol / ISF calls for it</li> <li>▲ Attacks may decrease; some hostile groups stated they are attacking because CF are in Iraq</li> </ul> <p><b>Unknown / Both:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▲ Less troops = less presence; effects vary on different audiences</li> <li>▲ Infrastructure impact? More / Less interdiction and attacks will occur</li> </ul>
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
### Predicted Perception Assessment

Sectarian concerns of ISF Economic loss with less CF Anti-Gol forces out lasted CF CF cannot protect the populace Iraqis must resolve Kirkuk issue US political pressure forcing draw-down	Draw-down is a deception / conspiracy <span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 100px; height: 40px; vertical-align: middle;"></span> CF have abandoned Sunni	Effects of fewer CF vary on different audiences Infrastructure attacks will increase / decrease	Gol / ISF are effective CF keeping their word and leaving Iraqis taking control of lives / country CF still available to assist Gol / ISF Attacks will decrease; groups stated attacks due to CF presence
<b>Negative</b>		<b>Positive</b>	


**IO So What: IO will mitigate negative perceptions by shaping the information environment far in advance to facilitate the draw-down**


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


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










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





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




Sir,

This chart shows the current Provincial Security Transition Assessment on the left, with the color rating for each of the four PSTA conditions: Threat activity, Governance, Iraqi Security Forces, and MNF-I Posture. Projected PIC dates are listed in the center, and on the right all provinces except Kirkuk are projected to be PIC by 31 July 2008. PIC for Kirkuk province is not projected until Article 140 resolution. In Kirkuk, the legitimacy and transparency of the provincial government is reduced due to the ongoing Arab and Turkoman boycott of the provincial council. Transition of security in Kirkuk prior to Article 140 resolution would be perceived as handing the province over to the Kurds, and could push minority sects into the insurgency, igniting the latent tension surrounding the article 140 issue.





My aim is to examine the capabilities of the ISF now and in the Aug 08 timeframe in order to identify those factors upon which we should concentrate in order to minimize risk as we move to a reduced force structure.

I will begin with command and control. The slide shows the current status of PIC and that forecast for 31 Jul 08. I have highlighted the PJCCs because their function and capability is inextricably linked with the security of the Province. Upon it is also imposed the current and future Operations Commands as they can be forecast today. For the IA, it is likely that the MOD, JHQ and IGFC will all function better than now but with some limitations. Those limitations are largely based on the quantity, quality or experience of leaders and therefore demand a human factors solution – in short continued proactive mentoring.

The Operations Commands will continue to be the C2 mechanism of choice and by Aug 08 we will see well established Operations Commands in Baghdad, Basra, Diyala, Karbala, Samarra, Ramadi (or certainly somewhere in Anbar) and Mosul. All will continue to face different challenges in the security situation and they will have differing relationships with the IA chain of command and the PM. CF engagement with this level of command will contribute to success. Importantly there must be, by Aug 08, a C2 mechanism in place to address the CSS aspects of units moving into and out of the responsibility of an operational command.

At the tactical level, 8 of 10 IA Divisional HQs are at ORA 1 or 2 and all ten are in IA lead. By Aug 08 it is expected that Headquarters 11 and 14 Divisions will be at or very near IA lead.


Tactical communications will have improved but not to the level required for complex battle-space coordination. In contrast, combined planning, battle-space coordination and liaison will increase in importance as battle-space is ceded to IA and if the IA seeks to deploy the 120mm mortars that it has procured.

The greatest impact on C2 will, however, be the lack of officers and NCOs, notwithstanding the initiative to recruit former regime army personnel.


Although the MOI and its subordinate elements are less advanced, the C2 challenges that it faces are less stark. As with the Army, the greatest impact on C2 for the IP, NP and Border Forces is the lack of officers and NCOs.

In summary, with continued, proactive mentoring, ISF C2 will be sufficiently robust by Aug 08 to present C2 as a manageable risk.









This slide shows the forecast disposition of the IA on 31 Jul 08. By then the IA will comprise 12 Divisions, 47 Brigades and 153 Battalions at FOC or better. The 1st Presidential Brigade will have been generated and plans for the integration of 2 Peshmerga Divisions will have become a reality. This total includes 9 of the former SIBs that will have completed training and will have transitioned to the IA as IAIB, leaving 8 to train and transition. Finally, the new EOD Regiment and the Infrastructure Repair Battalion will be in place.

Further equipment will have been fielded: Badger fielding will be complete by end 07, 110 BMP 1 will have been purchased to equip 3 IA BNs (probably in 5, 6 and 11 Divisions) and 251 ECM sets will be issued in early 08. M16/M4 fielding to 3, 6, 8, 9 DIV and 3/1 BDE will be complete and fielding of 60mm mortar could be achieved. Finally MRAP delivery may make HWMMV/UAH available for the IA and ~320 x 120mm mortars could be available.

This equipment delivery is not without implications – greater tactical mobility will result in greater demand for fuel; additional BMP battalions may result in a demand for operational mobility that is beyond the IA and 120mm mortars bring obvious requirements for FDC, tactical communications, interoperability and air-space control.

The ML and MDCOA briefed earlier highlighted the implications of sectarianism and militia influence and these will remain the greatest threat to IA acceptability.

Finally, the identified systemic issues (the lack of NCOs and officers and logistic support) will continue to hamper IA development and effectiveness.

#### UNITS NOT AT FOC AUG 08

Unit	FOC	Future Location
4/2/2 IA	TBD	Mosul?
4/3 IA	TBD	Ninewah
4/3/2 IA	TBD	TBD (IAIB)
4/4/2 IA	TBD	Mosul?
4/3/4 IA	TBD	Sulaymaniyah
12 IA	TBD	Tikrit
1/5/4 IA	TBD	Al Hiji (IAIB)
4/5/4 IA	TBD	Al Bakara (IAIB)
5/5/4 IA	TBD	Al Ryath (IAIB)
2/6/4 IA	TBD	Al Hathir (IAIB)
3/6/4 IA	TBD	Al Asmida (IAIB)
5/6/4 IA	TBD	Al Synia (IAIB)
5/3/6 IA	TBD	Mahmudiyah (IAIB)


4/14 IA

TBD

Basrah


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## IP Status 31 July 2008



MSC	Mol Authorized	CF Recommended Added IPs	Projected Total	Ratio: IP to Pop.
B	26,752	12,641	39,393	1:121
W	21,000	9,000	24,000	1:133
C	36,884	10,000	46,884	1:133
N	84,643	17,709	102,352	1:133
SE	46,417	3,346	49,763	1:133
CS	19,169	327	19,496	1:133
NE	4,344	0	4,344	1:133
	<b>239,209</b>	<b>52,696</b>	<b>286,232</b>	

▲ Baghdad IP expansion is projected to be complete by May 08  
 ▲ Will not meet projected Iraq wide totals by 31 July 2008 but will make progress towards the Mol 5 year end state  
 ▲ Currently working the plan for Iraq wide IP expansion  
 ▲ Availability of infrastructure, equipment and uniforms may slow the progress of Iraq wide IP expansion

- Reconciliation efforts will result in a steady increase in IP numbers and greater Shia/Sunni policing of their own areas.
- Baghdad IP Expansion will be followed by a similar process elsewhere.
- IP capability to conduct effective independent operations will continue to increase.
- Local security, particularly in PIC Provinces will be increasingly led by the IP but the IA and NP will remain in the lead where COIN operations are being conducted.

- Sectarianism and militia influence pose the greatest long-term threat to ISF acceptability.
- The lack of officers will continue to inhibit IP development and effectiveness.
- IP unlikely to have achieved effective administration:
  - Database for Criminal Records
  - Standardized reporting procedures
  - Institutional investigative standard

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
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This slide shows the ORA status of the IP now and a forecast for 31 Jul 08 for the Provinces and for the major cities. The IP currently comprises an authorised strength of 239,209 with 238,681 assigned. Based on current proposals this will increase to at least 286,232 by next July.

Reconciliation will contribute both to an increase in IP and more representational policing, dependent on MOI clearing the names of potential recruits and issuing hiring orders. By 31 Jul 08 the Baghdad IP expansion will have seen the use of expedient police stations and the first of the new stations will be complete.

This expansion is not without risk; financial, training, logistic and sectarian but if successful could be followed by a similar process elsewhere. The scale of effort required for such activity demands that future expansion of this type be prioritised to deliver greatest effect in relation to CF posture and presence.

Sectarianism and militia influence pose the greatest long-term threat to ISF acceptability and the lack of officers will continue to inhibit IP development and effectiveness.



TT will continue to be required and in greater numbers.

**A transition to a regionally based force will require a basing concept and CF engagement.**

**Conduct true combined operations.**

**Conduct combined exercises in order to refocus and develop ORA1/2 units.**

**Mentor NP leaders.**

**Develop robust strategy for dealing with NP leaders and units that demonstrate sectarian behavior.**


**Expand Officer and NCO training base.**


### Requirement for NP collective training centre.

## Carabinieri Training

QRF BN	20 OCT - 15 DEC 07
1-2 NP BN	22 DEC - 16 FEB 08
2-2 NP BN	23 FEB- 19 APR 08
3-2 NP BN	26 APR- 21 JUN 08
1-1 NP BN	28 JUN - 23 AUG 08
1-6 NP BN	30 AUG - 25 OCT 08
1-7 NP BN	01 NOV- 27 DEC 08
1-8 NP BN	03 JAN- 28 FEB 09
1-4 NP BN	7 MAR -2 MAY 09
1-5 NP BN	9 MAY- 4 JUL 09
2-1 NP BN	11 JUL - 5 SEP 09
1-3 NP BN	9 MAY- 4 JUL 09








Sir, the slide on the left shows the current ISF laydown and the current TT shortages which you were briefed on yesterday.

In the TT column the numbers in blue are the internal Transition teams

And the number in red at the bottom of each call out box shows the current TT shortages






Sir, the slide on the left shows the projected numbers for the ISF and the TT shortages as of 31 JUL 08.

The number in purple shows the growth of the ISF during this time.

MND-N, MND-SE and MND-B have the largest amount of growth over this time.

We project that we will be short approximately 128 Transition teams at this point

Sir the bottom line of this slide is the box highlighted in red in the impacts box.



Sir, the next two slides represent windows of opportunity to transition to some type of advisory BDE.


This decision must be based on current conditions on the ground.

In order to implement any type of change to the forces we must notify those units effected early enough so they are prepared to assume the role of an advisory BDE. This requires early Decision Points in the planning process.


In the timeline we have placed a DEPORD to 15 BCTs in the event there is no change to the forces needed in theater while simultaneously issuing a WARNO to three BDEs to prepare to deploy as an advisory BDE. A second Decision point allows the CDR to offramp the forces he will not need based on the conditions on the ground.

In the event there are no changes to the situation in theater, the force level remains at 15 BDEs and the decision cycle starts again in 2009.





Sir I believe you have seen this slide before, this is simply a model of the four methods arrayed along a line representing the threat continuum where high represents an area like Baghdad and low is an area like Tal Afar.




Sir, the next two slides lay out a couple of examples of how these models can be applied to battlespace.

In MNF-W out along the western border we use an Enhanced LT model where the threat is lower and as we move towards Fallujah and the threat increases the models change.

Around the Haditha area we move to an Enhanced Heavy model.

4/7 IA will be a brand new unit so we used an embed model in an attempt to put more emphasis on rapidly building this unit and finally near Fallujah we use a standard model.






Sir, next we move to MND-N in the Ninewa province.

In MND-N we used a combination of Enhanced Heavy and Enhanced Light to cover the IA units. To cover all the borders and IA units would require

1/3 ACR is dedicated to ISF/TT oversight and 2/3 ACR is centrally located to act as a QRF.

3/3 ACR is free to conduct kinetic operations or could assume additional battlespace




Produced by (b)(3), (b)(6)  
MNC-I Basing Engineer  
18 SEP 07



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
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1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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


In MND NE and the US led MND's, One of the significant changes is Georgia will remove their Brigade from FOB Delta, but maintain 1.4b soldiers in the UNAMI mission.


Lithuania will add 1.4b soldiers in NOV 07.








Sir, moving on to MND-CS, Slovakia will withdraw it's 1.4 staff officers by the end of the year.







Denmark will remove their 1.4b Soldier Helicopter detachment in DEC 07 and they will not be replaced.

And the UK withdrawing down to 1.4b soldiers by Aug 08.







Sir, 3/25 and 1/10 MTN will be the next Brigade to RIP/TOA. Two things to note on this RIP. First, as we laid out for you Monday night 1/10 MTN is a candidate for sourcing the TF 1.4a mission in January so long as we remain at 20 BCTs. If General Mixon decides to pull a battalion from 1/10 MTN that may preclude detaching a battalion from this Brigade to reinforce 3/1 CD in Diyala. The remaining battalions should replace 3/25 IDs battalions one-for-one.



Sir, this chart represents the conclusion or endstate of our reduction in force from 20 to 15 BCTs. We assume that we will have non-standard Brigade headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces and a non-standard division headquarters in MND-C. We also assume that the new embassy move will be complete with the JASG HQ providing security for the IZ. The dotted line north of the IZ gives you flexibility that if conditions warrant we could reposition combat power that is currently providing security on Haifa Street.

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*Combat and Combat Support* 

# Force Enablers

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


# MANEUVER AVIATION

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### Key Task:

CM2RI  
RTE / AREA RECON  
CONVOY SECURITY  
TIC RESPONSE  
TIER / VIP ESCORT

DRRF  
AIR ASSAULT  
CMD GRP  
CARGO  
AMR / RING RTE

MEDEVAC

CARGO  
AIR ASSAULT

AMR

**Mission Capability:**

**AH-64D and KW AWTs-**

MND-N is able to produce 12 AWT's (AH), and 31 SWTs (KW)

MND-B can produce 24 AWTs (AH)

MND-C will be able to produce 12 AWT's (AH), and 15 SWTs (KW)

Corps Avn is able to produce 12 AWTs

**UH-60L-**

MND-N is able to produce 24 MS

MND-B is able to produce 19 MS

MND-C is able to produce 19 MS

Corps Avn will be able to produce 34 MS

**CH-47D**

MND-N is able to produce 6 MS

MND-B is able to produce 6 MS

MND-C is able to produce 6 MS

Corps Avn is able to produce 6 MS




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CMD GRP  
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MEDEVAC

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AIR ASSAULT

AMR

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
# MANEUVER

## Civil Affairs

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### Key Task:

- (S//REL) Execution of COIN operations.
- (S//REL) Establishing a security environment that facilitates the development of local economies, governance, and the rule of law.
- (S//REL) Neutralization of the insurgency and defeat of AQI.
- (S//REL) Set favorable conditions for, and facilitate transfer of, area of operations to Iraqi Security Forces and further provincial assumption of PIC.
- (S//REL) Support future Iraqi Provincial Elections and the political process.
- (S//REL) Support engagement of Iraqi leaders, tribes and clerics.
- (S//REL) Support the operations of DoS led pPRTs and ePRTs as directed.
- (S//REL) Support provincial and local governments in capacity development.
- (S//REL) Assist in increasing primacy of the RoL.

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


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**Combat and Combat Support** 

**MANEUVER**

**Civil Military  
Operations (PRT)**

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
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### Lead for Governance and Economic activities

### Strengthen the capacity of Provincial governments to accelerate the transition to Iraqi self-reliance

### Build sustainable programs to meet the expectations of the Iraqi people

**Implement short term programs with immediate economic and governance impacts to fill the gap while sustainable programs have time to take root**



#### ePRT Tasks- Sub-Provincial level

Bolster moderates and shape the political environment

Support MNC-I counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy

Strengthen the capacity of Local governments to accelerate the transition to Iraqi self-reliance


Promote reconciliation; increase number of stakeholders

Build sustainable programs to meet the expectations of the Iraqi people


Empower Iraqis to build sustainable capacity

Implement short term programs with immediate economic and governance impacts to fill the gap while sustainable programs have time to take root









- 2 x 1.4g (STG TM) (50 SM)
- 1 x Tactical Exploitation TM (13 SM, split into 3 x 4 SM teams w/ 1 OIC)
- 1 x CI FO 513th HQ (Deutsche) (3 SM)
- 1 x CI Det (12 x SM split into 6 Teams: Victory1, Victory2, Marez, Speicher, Anaconda, IZ)
- \*7 x CREW EWO/Support (269 SM)
- 1 x 1.4c SPT Section (16 x SM split into 5 Teams: CIOC, US Embassy, MNF-W, MND-B, CACE)
- 1 x DOMEX Section (75 SM split into 15 x BCT Teams)
- 3 x DOMEX HQs (31 SM)
- 1 x SPACE SPT TM (10 SM split into 2 teams: MNF-W, MNC-I)
- 3 x Linguist Requirements (SM are contracted and not military sourced)
- MNF-I**
- 1 x JIDC (TF 1.4a) (160 SM)
- 1 x (b)(3) 50 USC § 3605 (8 SM)
- 1 x COMTECH TM (6 SM)
- 1 x CMT (3 SM)

1 x GOI VETTING TEAM (RFF 772) (12 SM)

1 x SIE (RFF 772) (7 SM)

**RFF 719 One time Surge Units Redeploy in FY 08:**

-7 x SM MET Teams (MND-B)

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- 1 x WI Detachment (2 SM)

- 5 x DOCEX teams (25 x SM)

83 x Total SM Redeploy


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


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
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
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#### FA

- Fires BDE HQ (-) – MND-B, MND-N, **MND-C**
- MLRS BTRY – split ops – 1 x PLT at FOB Hammer & 1 x PLT at FOB Normandy
- Radars – all EAD radars now Q36 and located at following FOBs:
  - MND-N (13) – Brasfield-Mora, Paliwoda, 2 x Warrior, Marez, Sykes, Speicher, Warehouse, Summerall, 4 x Anaconda & TAB HQs
  - MND-B (3) – Str ker, 2 x Liberty & TAB HQs
  - MND-C (1) – Delta
  - MNF-W (1) – Falluja

#### ADA

- CRAM
  - Intercept BTRYs at LSA Anaconda & VBC
  - Sense&Warn batteries located at 14 priority FOBs in al MNDs.
- Traditional – Avenger Btry – VBC and IZ locations & Sentinel – 2 x PLTs – (VBC/Tikrit)

#### EWO

MND	Staff	BDE	BN	FSOperator	FSLeader
B(76)	7	7	45	0	1
N(49)	6	7	30	2	4
C(25)	4	4	20	0	3
W(42)	5	7	30	0	0
316(35)	7	7	19	0	2
Sep(22)	0	7	17	0	0

LNOs (6) at OCFI, CJSOTF, CTEWCC, ARCENT  
Kuwait (7) Training and Depot

#### Key Task:

Plan, direct, develop intelligence, execute and supervise the Div's counterfire fight and radar operations. Provide supervision, training, and overwatch for Field Artillery and fire support operations within the Division. Plans, coordinate, and integrate Joint and Coalition lethal and nonlethal tactical level fires in support of Div operations. **Fires BDE HQ (-)**

Provide Close Air Support, EW Support, and responsive TIC/SD coverage ISO CF, to include transition teams. Provide joint fires ISO the ISF as required to prevent operational failure. **MLRS/Joint Air**

Combined-arms Counter-IDF shaping, denial, and response operations; protect force and FOBs with C-RAM Sense & Warn and Intercept capabilities. C-RAM


Provide Counterfire RADAR support ISO MNC-I and subordinate units. EAD radars

Advises, plans, and conducts Corps, DIV, BDE, and BN level electronic warfare operations. Oversees the fielding, employment, and sustainment of ground CREW systems and CREW personnel. EWOs

Conduct analysis and provide weekly, monthly, and quarterly assessments on CDR objectives.  
Assessments Cell

1.4a, 1.4g

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**Combat and Combat Support** 


**FIRES**

**PSYOP**

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## Key Tasks:

### PSYOP Task Force (POTF) HQ

Conducts MNC-I's operational level PSYOP

Assists the TPCs when needed

Provides C2 from the Corps as necessary and assists in repair / replacement of PSYOP specific equipment and PSYOP personnel

A Regional PSYOP Co (-) is part of the POTF and provides regional expertise in PSYOP development

### Tactical PSYOP Co (TPC) HQ

Provides planning assistance to the Div HQ

Provides C2 for the TPDs in the MND's AO

Has a TPDD which conducts target audience analysis, PSYOP development and limited production

### Tactical PSYOP Det (TPD)

Provides C2 of Tactical PSYOP Teams in the BCT's AO

**Provides staff support to BCT-level HQ**

**Coordinates with the TPC for PSYOP support requirements**

**Conducts face-to-face communications, loudspeaker operations, and dissemination of print products and novelty items to target audiences**

**Comprised of a HQ and three or four teams, which support maneuver BNs**

#### **IO FST**

**Provides operational-level planning, targeting and execution support**

**Provides IO-focused, multi-disciplined expertise**

**Coordinates and synchronizes IO intelligence**

**Develops and nominates IO targets**

**Provides interoperability within the IO community and CENTCOM**

#### **COMCAM HQ**

**Provides COMCAM planning and C2 for Multi-Service COMCAM Teams**

**Manages collection, storage and distribution of all COMCAM imagery in Iraq**


**COMCAM TM - Provides a directed imagery collection capability within MNC-I**

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
**Combat and Combat Support** 

# FIRES

# PAO

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## Key Tasks:

### Public Affairs Assets

Public Affairs Detachment (PAD)  
Broadcast Operations Detachment (BOD)  
Public Affairs Operations Center (PAOC)  
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)

### Provide media facilitation capabilities:

Ensure leaders and troops are capable and trained to engage civilian news media.

### Provide print and broadcast products:

Produce digital photographic images and audiovisual products in support of the CI program.

### Operate Coalition Press Information Center:

Provides a Joint Public Affairs capability to MNF-I.

Operate the Digital Video and Imagery

Distribution System (DVIDS):

Transmit digital products for broadcast to local, national and international media outlets.

Conduct live interviews from remote locations.

Monitor the global and information environments:

Provide strategic information guidance and theater-level coordination for all PAO operations.

Conduct PA planning and analysis

Develop information strategies and campaigns in support of operations.

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


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Ensure leaders and troops are capable and trained to engage civilian news media.

### Provide print and broadcast products:

Produce digital photographic images and audiovisual products in support of the CI program.

### Operate Coalition Press Information Center:

Provides a Joint Public Affairs capability to MNF-I.



Operate the Digital Video and Imagery

Distribution System (DVIDS):

Transmit digital products for broadcast to local, national and international media outlets.

Conduct live interviews from remote locations.

Monitor the global and information environments:

Provide strategic information guidance and theater-level coordination for all PAO operations.

Conduct PA planning and analysis

Develop information strategies and campaigns in support of operations.

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
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# FIRES

# EASOG

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### Key Task:

- Plan, request, and control CAS, ISR, EW ISO MNDs (ALOs/JTACs)
- Prioritize & distribute CAS, EW sorties among MNDs (ASOC)
- Provide weather support to all ITO aviation (WX)
- Provide C2 & airspace deconfliction to all joint air/firepower (CRC)
- Communicates, facilitates, advises, coordinates & supports synchronization between CFACC & MNF-I (ACCE)

### Balad

10xC-130E/H3

12xF-16CG

12xF-16C+

15xF-16CJ

05xHH-60G

54

### Al Asad

09xA-10

09xEA-6B

02xAngel Fire

20

Ali

01xC-130SV

04xP-3C AIP

05

Outside ITO

24xC-130E/H1

03xEC-130H/CC

01xEC-130J/CS

28xKC-135R

10xKC-10

07xB-1B

03xC-21A

01xC-20

06xE-8C

04xRC-135 V/W

05xP-3C AIP

04xP-3 MTI

03xEP-3E

13xC-17

01xE-6B TACAMO

05xU-2

03xE-3 AWACS

121

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
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# COMMAND AND CONTROL

## Signal

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**Key Task:**

**SIG BDE:**

Provide C2 for SIG BN/ ESB.

Provide appropriate voice and data Signal support to U.S. and Coalition Forces.

Establish, maintain and operate a system Control Cell to monitor network health, track, control, engineer, and source all telecommunications service requests.

**SIG BN/ ESB:**

Plan, engineer, install, operate, maintain and restore Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology (C4IT) Nodes in support of U.S. and Coalition Forces.

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**Key Task:**

**CORPS SIG CO**

Provide communications support to the Corps TAC.

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# SUSTAINMENT

## Logistics

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There are 26 SSAs located in Iraq, 10 are task organized to the 316<sup>th</sup> ESC 14 are organic BCT BSBs, and 2 are class IX air SSAs. Of the 26 SSAs, 22 are multi-class SSAs, one is a class IX ground SSA, 2 are class IX air SSAs, and 1 is a class II, IIIp, IV SSA. Included in the multi-class SSA count is LSAA's Forward Redistribution Point (FRP), which serves as an excess collection point for serviceable excess class II, IIIp, IV, and IX, goes on the shelf and is not immediately excessed out as retrograde to Kuwait.

**DISTRIBUTION FLOW:** Multi-Class supplies are delivered via air and ground into Iraq. Supplies are routinely delivered via air primarily through Kuwait, Balad/LSAA, BIAP, and Al Asad and via opportune air to the other Iraqi airfields. Theater trucks deliver general supplies from Kuwait to Tallil, VBC, TQ, LSAA, and Speicher, 1/82 BCT provides gun truck escorts for theater trucks. 106 Trans Bn, 213<sup>th</sup> ASG, delivers supplies from the LSAA to Taji, Speicher, Q-West, and TQ. CSG and SB trucks deliver from the GS/DS hubs to BCT SSAs at the major FOBs and outlying camps and combat outposts. MEF trucks deliver USMC specific items from TQ and Al Asad to MEF camps in the MNF-W AO.

Central Issue Facilities are located at LSAA and Baghdad and provide direct exchange for CIF items managed by 316<sup>th</sup> ESC



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# SUSTAINMENT SECFOR

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## **SIR**

**This is the SECFOR set, comprising of Base Security and Convoy Security, in addition to the 1/82 Theater Security Brigade.**

**The numbers reflect the movement of some CSS assets to SECFOR, and the way that CSC units are resourced.**

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# SUSTAINMENT

## AG

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**Key Task:**

Provide direct personnel service support to commanders and soldiers within AOR from all components  
Operate personnel service support systems - CAC, eMILPO, TOPMIS, DTAS; support casualty operations  
Provides standard, accountable, and casualty mail services to supported population.  
Provides reception, return to duty, replacement, R&R and redeployment accountability support and Fixed wing APODs  
Provide 24/7 operations in support CSHs, Mortuary Affairs Collection Points, ASCC headquarters and the HRSC Casualty Operations Division.

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Provides reception, return to duty, replacement, R&R and redeployment accountability support and Fixed wing APODs


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# SUSTAINMENT

## Medical

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**PM Med Det:** Provides preventive medicine support throughout Iraq to include inspections of MWR facilities, unit food sources, etc...

**Ground Amb CO:** Provides ambulance transport assets and personnel for all EAD units. Augments CLPs and units short medics.

**Optometry teams:** Provides optometry support to the entire ITO, to include exams, glass prescriptions and health related eye injuries.

**Blood Det:** Provides distribution and handling of all blood products in theater.

**Med Log CO:** Receives, sorts, and distributes all Medical Logistics to EAD and Divisional assets.

**Vet Det:** Provides food inspection and animal care for all military working dogs in theater.

**Dental CO:** Provides area support dental services to units without organic dental assets

**SB Aug Det:** Provides PM and CSC assets to the SB that were lost during transformation—see CSC and PM breakout for key tasks.

**Eye Surgical & Neurology Det:** Provides care to Soldiers with facial trauma to include eyes/nose/mouth/ear trauma. Provides Neuro Surgery to spine injury victims.

**CSC:** Provides Mental Health/combat stress control to units without organic CSC assets.

**Key Tasks:**

Provide Health Service Support and Force Health Protection (FHP) to US and Coalition Forces. Provide life, limb or eyesight care for Iraqi Civilians.

**LV III Combat Support Hospital (CSH):**

Provide level III medical care to stabilize and sustain Casualties until RTD or evacuated out of theater.

**Multi-Functional Medical Bn (MMB):**

Provide operational and technical supervision and administrative assistance for functional medical units operating the BCT and or Division areas.

**Area Support Med Company (ASMC):**

Provide Echelon I and II FHP and ground evacuation to the units located in area of

operations of the ASMC. Provide C2, administrative and clinical support of Troop Medical Clinics throughout the ITO.

**Forward Surgical Team (FST):**

Provide forward trauma surgical support, preoperative care, urgent lifesaving surgery and post-anesthesia recovery until evacuation within the ITO.

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**Impact:**

**CSC:** Risk of not sourcing is increased suicides and DNBI casualties within the theater

**ASMC:** Risk of not sourcing will result in longer lines of evacuation and degraded forces due to longer travel times for necessary medical support.

**FST:** Risk of not filling would cause significant surgical degradation at the LV III facilities that they have been augmented with.

**PM Med Det:** Risk of not filling loss of MWR type facilities on the FOB (the PM assets inspect these facilities and ensure sanitary working conditions to prevent PM disease breakouts).

**Ground Amb CO:** Risk of not sourcing would

degrade ground Medevac transport on FOBs.

**Optometry teams:** Risk of not sourcing would be loss of spectacle production, routine eye exams and a lack of ability to treat eye injuries.

**Blood Det:** Risk of not sourcing would result in the inability to provide blood products in ITO.

**Med Log CO:** Risk of not sourcing would result in no medical supplies for all medical units in theater.

**Vet Det:** Risk of not sourcing would jeopardize the health and preventive maintenance of over 500 military working dogs as well as the food sources of all food served to coalition forces.

**Dental CO:** Risk of not sourcing will be DNBI casualties that cannot perform their mission due to dental emergencies.

**SB Aug Det:** See PM and CSC comments.

**MMBs and C2 elements:** Risk of not sourcing would limit force health protection capabilities and command oversight and planning efforts for all medical units in ITO.

**Eye Surgical & Neurology Det:** Risk of not sourcing is the lack of specialized spinal injury and facial trauma in the critical hours that will significantly improve a casualties survivability

**LV III Hospital:** Risk of not sourcing would be longer lines of evacuation potentially resulting in higher casualty rates.

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**Combat and Combat Support** 

**PROTECTION**

**Engineers**

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
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**Key Tasks:**

- Decon
- Recon / HAZMAT ID
- CW munitions  
characterization,  
handling and destruction

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
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**Key Task:**

**MP BDE:**

Advise MND-B on IP development and PTT employment  
Provides Provincial-PTT to teach and coach IP leadership and management systems  
OPCON of MP BNs

**MP BN:**

Advise BCT/DIV on IP development and PTT employment  
Provides District-PTT to teach and coach IP leadership in management systems  
ADCON of MP COs

**MP CO:**

PTT population  
Teach and coach the 5 Police Competencies and Holistic Station Management

**L&O Det:** Provides Law and Order of FOB

**MP Augmentation Team:** Advise DIV and BCT Cdrs on pre-TIF Det Ops

**PEDD/SSD/EDD:** Explosive Detection Dog

**PNDD:** Narcotic Detection Dog

**CD:** Remains Detection Dog

**CTD:** Trail Detection Dog

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Combat and Combat Support

# PROTECTION

## CJTF

1.4a

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**Assumptions:**

92% manning:  $44 \times .92 = 41$  SM per CO  
 $38 \times .92 = 35$  SM per BN

**Key Tasks:**

Integrates & exploits tactical and technical intelligence, conducts specialized C-IED operations to achieve strategic, operational & tactical effects

CJTF 1.4a HQ plans and synchronizes specialized C-IED operations for MNC-I.

3 EOD BN synchs C-IED mission support w/ MSCs, commands & controls EOD COs

19 EOD COs integrate & synchronize EOD support to BCTs; execute EOD operations

1.4c assists CJTF 1.4a with C-IED Fusion; commands & controls WI sections, WITs

4 WI LNO Teams coordinates WIT support with MSC HQs, commands & controls WITs

18 WITs conduct Post-Blast Analyses, C-IED Strike Planning, IED Cell Profiling

CEXC Exploits IED evidence, derives IED tech intelligence, coords Interagency exploitation

C-IED Training Team promotes and trains MNC-I forces on new and emerging C-IED TTP

TEU exploits CBR weapons; samples, packages & escorts items for further exploitation

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# INTERAGENCY

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**MND-N**

Conduct assured mobility patrols route sanitation; culvert protection; and crater and/or culvert repair to allow freedom of maneuver (FOM) for all CF, ISF and Iraqi civilians

Conduct off Forward Operating Base (FOB) general engineering construction in support of BCTs and ISF. Defeat the IED network ICW Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and BCT assets to conduct combined arms Counter IED (CIED) missions

Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership).

Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan.

Execute bridge Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) throughout MND-N within 72 hours.

**MND-B**

Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbook standards appropriate to the contingency operatin site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition, and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF 1.4a missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

### **30 NCR**

Conduct survivability operations at designated Camps IOT increase force protection levels and survivability of the force

BPT construct or assist in the construction of, border forts IOT enhance the force protection of the Border Defense Forces

Conduct MSR/ASR maintenance IOT allow for continued sustainment operations along key GLOCs

Conduct general engineer support IOT provide improved life and camp support

BPT maintain AND improve existing APODs

BPT conduct mobility or security operations in support of MNC-I bridging missions

BPT partner with Iraqi Engineer formations IOT mentor Iraqi engineers in engineer operations

BPT provide engineer support to the Iraqi Security Forces IOT enable ISF

operations

BPT Conduct Counter-mobility Operations ISO MNF-W forces.

### **20th ENG BDE**

Focused route clearance

Route sanitization and culvert denial

Crater and culvert repair on corps MSRs and ASRs

Tactical bridging, rafting, and riverine operations

Tactical construction of JSS/COP/ECP/TCP/patrol bases, HLZ, FARP, Rapid Refuel Point (RRP) and initial T/O structures

Operational construction and enhancement of bases and facilities to temporary and expeditionary standards

Master planning and design

Project and program management

Prime power operations

Theater Class IV construction material management

Train, develop, and partner with ISF Engineers

Transition engineer missions to ISF Engineers

Assist interagency organizations with reconstruction and economic development

Conduct Information Operations to build understanding and support of GOI and Coalition operations

Creatively undertake unorthodox missions and tasks to exploit the full potential of this joint engineer team

Provide topographic survey, analysis, and production support



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1.4c 31 JUL 08		SECRET//REL MCFI		<b>Seven Key Tasks:</b> T: Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF) P: Targeting high level, high visibility corrupt Iraqi officials and law enforcement in partnerships with Iraqi NIIA  T: CT Working Group (CTWG) P: Intelligence collection and dissemination regarding force protection and U.S. based CT interests. Coordination with the USIC.  T: Hostage Working Group P: Investigate American Citizens (AMCITs) who have been kidnapped; work jointly with Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC)  T: Detainee Operations P: Conduct interrogations to gather intelligence to further the mission of coalition forces; and conduct investigations to present criminal cases to Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI)  T: Counter-IED support to Combined Explosive Exploitation Center (CEXC) P: Intel and Forensics collection of post-blast evidence and processing that is material for criminal trials and force protection  T: Sensitive Site Exploitations (SSE) P: Embedded agents collecting evidence to make cases against terrorists/insurgents  T: Law and Order Task Force (LOATF) P: Build Iraqi investigative capability  <b>Impact:</b> No Impact	
<b>MND-N</b> 2 x TSF Interrogation Teams (27) 1 x Sensitive Site Exploitation Team (6) 1.4c down 4 1.4c 1 x 1.4c LNO, DOD <b>TOTAL SM = 34 SM (Down 4)</b>		<b>MND-N</b> 1/10 ID 1/101 AA 2/25 ID (SBCT) 2/1 AD 3/101 AA 4/3 ID XX DIV <b>MND-C</b>			
<b>MND-BAGHDAD</b> Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) (10) 1 x MCTF (4) 1.4c 2 1.4c 2 1.4c 1 x CT Working Group (4) 1.4c 1 x LAOTF (1) 1.4c 1.4c 1 x HWG (4) 1.4c down one 1.4c 1 x Detainee Interrogations (6) 1.4c 1 x Counter-IED Support to CEXC (2) 1.4c Special Agent Bomb Technician (SABT) <b>TOTAL SM = 38 SM (Down 1)</b>					
DATE	SM				
1 OCT 07	1.4c 77 DOD (1)				
31 JUL 08	1.4c 72 DOD (1)				
DIFF	-05				
Reason: No change		SECRET//REL MCFI			

## MND-N

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Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership).

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Operational construction and enhancement of bases and facilities to temporary and expeditionary standards

Master planning and design

Project and program management

Prime power operations

Theater Class IV construction material management

Train, develop, and partner with ISF Engineers

Transition engineer missions to ISF Engineers

Assist interagency organizations with reconstruction and economic development

Conduct Information Operations to build understanding and support of GOI and Coalition operations

Creatively undertake unorthodox missions and tasks to exploit the full potential of this joint engineer team

Provide topographic survey, analysis, and production support

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**MND-N**

Conduct assured mobility patrols route sanitation; culvert protection; and crater and/or culvert repair to allow freedom of maneuver (FOM) for all CF, ISF and Iraqi civilians

Conduct off Forward Operating Base (FOB) general engineering construction in support of BCTs and ISF. Defeat the IED network ICW Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and BCT assets to conduct combined arms Counter IED (CIED) missions

Train ready and credible IA engineer units (partnership).

Conduct on FOB construction to improve the force protection and aid in the FOB realignment plan.

Execute bridge Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) throughout MND-N within 72 hours.

**MND-B**

Provide continuous base camp master planning support to BCTs IOT meet the Sandbook standards appropriate to the contingency operatin site, location, or base.

Synchronize assured mobility operations within the Baghdad AO by providing General Support (GS) with force pool engineer assets and engineer effects modules.

Execute base expansion, development, and closures for coalition, and closures for coalition and ISF ISO MNC-I coalition base transfer and closure plan in coordination with the Division Staff Engineer Section.

Provide C2 for TF 1.4a missions executing assured mobility operations in support of Division MSRs IOT prevent AIF from emplacing and detonating IEDs. Monitor BCT assured mobility operations IOT track and assess IED trends.

Perform project management of operational/tactical reconstruction. Design, build, QA/QC, harvest, relocate, and transition completed projects to other agencies or ministries as soon as practical. Assess mission construction capabilities to conduct expedient route repair.

### **30 NCR**

Conduct survivability operations at designated Camps IOT increase force protection levels and survivability of the force

BPT construct or assist in the construction of, border forts IOT enhance the force protection of the Border Defense Forces

Conduct MSR/ASR maintenance IOT allow for continued sustainment operations along key GLOCs

Conduct general engineer support IOT provide improved life and camp support

BPT maintain AND improve existing APODs

BPT conduct mobility or security operations in support of MNC-I bridging missions

BPT partner with Iraqi Engineer formations IOT mentor Iraqi engineers in engineer operations

BPT provide engineer support to the Iraqi Security Forces IOT enable ISF

operations

BPT Conduct Counter-mobility Operations ISO MNF-W forces.

### **20th ENG BDE**

Focused route clearance

Route sanitization and culvert denial

Crater and culvert repair on corps MSRs and ASRs

Tactical bridging, rafting, and riverine operations

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## Major Tasks by Phase



- Phases apply to a designated locale or area – not necessarily unit AOs or entire provinces
- Tasks by phase vary depending on local conditions, generally reflecting improving ISF capability
- Depending on the size of their AOs, BCTs and perhaps battalions could be in one or more phases and thus may execute different mission sets
- Several sub-tasks fall under each major task
- Sub-tasks by phase reflect a shift in emphasis over time

**Coalition Force Major Tasks**

- Population security
- Infrastructure security
- Border security
- Building civil and governmental capacity
- Engagement
- ISF development and support
- Strike operations
- Information operations and public affairs
- Force protection

Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population security</li> <li>• Infrastructure security</li> <li>• Border security</li> <li>• Building civil and governmental capacity</li> <li>• Engagement</li> <li>• ISF development and support</li> <li>• Strike operations</li> <li>• Information operations and public affairs</li> <li>• Force protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population security</li> <li>• Infrastructure security</li> <li>• Border security</li> <li>• Building civil and governmental capacity</li> <li>• Engagement</li> <li>• ISF development and support</li> <li>• Strike operations</li> <li>• Information operations and public affairs</li> <li>• Force protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population security</li> <li>• Infrastructure security</li> <li>• Border security</li> <li>• Building civil and governmental capacity</li> <li>• Engagement</li> <li>• ISF development and support</li> <li>• Strike operations</li> <li>• Information operations and public affairs</li> <li>• Force protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population security</li> <li>• Infrastructure security</li> <li>• Border security</li> <li>• Building civil and governmental capacity</li> <li>• Engagement</li> <li>• ISF development and support</li> <li>• Strike operations</li> <li>• Information operations and public affairs</li> <li>• Force protection</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population security</li> <li>• Infrastructure security</li> <li>• Border security</li> <li>• Building civil and governmental capacity</li> <li>• Engagement</li> <li>• ISF development and support</li> <li>• Strike operations</li> <li>• Information operations and public affairs</li> <li>• Force protection</li> </ul>
<p><b>Clear, Control, Retain</b></p>				

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**Proposed Course of Action: Full Mission Set (15 BCT)**

**MNC-I reduces total number of BCTs from 20 to 15. Economies in personnel are achieved where possible, while not threatening security gains made from Fardh al Qanoon.**

1. 2 Reserve Infantry Battalions perform security in IZ to allow COIN trained forces to conduct operations in Adhamiyah/ Sadr City
2. Forces retain ability to clear, control, and retain only in select areas
3. 2 Non-Standard Brigade Headquarters in Al Qut and Ramadi provide leader interaction with ISF, as well as local/provincial government, tribal and other local leaders
4. Where conditions are appropriate, forces conduct tactical, operational, or strategic overwatch
5. Where appropriate, partnership, enhanced transition teams and transition teams further develop ISF capability
6. March assessment will determine the composition of US forces in Iraq after July 2008

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**MND-N: Risk**



✧ **Operational Plan**

- Decisive Elements - Ninewa PIC, Defeat AQI in Diyala, Keep Kurds in political process, Deny SaD as sanctuary, GOI reciprocates Sunni reconciliation gestures, Build Iraqi civil and military institutions
- Implementation - Move squadron from Ninewa in early 2008 to Zaab region as a bridge to enduring security in SaD and Kirkuk, Continue to advance reconciliation and institution-building, Hold in the Baghdad Belt which will require at least 4 full BCTs


✧ **Risks to The Plan with Recommendations for how MNC-I can Mitigate**

- Losing momentum in Baqubah and Diyala - Provide additional Stryker BN to 4/2 SBCT, Influence GOI to increase the IP hiring authorization for Diyala, Realign MND-N/MND-B boundary; Tarmiyah and Husseinayah back to MND-B
- Inability to continue Population Security/JSS Mission - Change MND-N mission in Ninewa province, Return all MND-N IA units from Ninewa currently serving in MND-B
- Sustaining CLC partnership and oversight - Influence GOI to increase the IP hiring authorization for Diyala
- Security in Kirkuk/ Mosul in advance of Article 140 referendum - Relieve MND-N of the TF 1.4a tasking.
- Strategic Infrastructure Security - Enhance partnership/coordination with Peshmerga forces, Increase transition teams or combat power to perform this mission
- Border Security - Request guidance on where this task falls in MNC-I priority of effort, Maintain current focus of TF 1.4a

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**Demonstrate to Sunnis they will be included**  
**Reinforce with at least 3 of 5 returning IA BNs**  
**BG Muthaa promoted to MG**  
**Provincial elections conducted early**  
**Resist temptation to reinforce with US BNs**  
**Support 2nd and 3rd IA DIVs and IPs with enablers**  
**Prevent sectarian revenge to inevitable AQI provocation**  
**Need GoI/US embassy help advancing Art. 140 process**  
**Use Tribal Security Companies as bridge to Sunni inclusion/ reconciliation**  
**Strengthen institutions**  
**Stay strong in Baghdad Belt - all of 4-2 SBCT and additional Battalion**  
**Hussaniyah back to MND-B**  
**Need help from HHQ and US Embassy to push GoI reciprocation of Sunni reconciliation gestures**  
**IFCNR results needed**



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**MNF-W: Risk**





- ✧ **Reduction from 14 to 6 Battalion from Sep 07 to May 08**
  - Return of 2-2/1 IA Bn from MND-N to rejoin its parent Bde in AO SAKAR
  - IRAQI Police hire/fielding equipment for up to 30,000
  - Generation of 4<sup>th</sup> Bde, 7<sup>th</sup> IA Div: Support for construction of facilities
  - Return of 4<sup>th</sup> Bde, 1<sup>st</sup> IA Div or its regeneration
  - Vehicle fielding to 1<sup>st</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> IA Div to support expanded operational environment
- ✧ **Transition from CERP to DoS and GoI funding will limit flexibility and timeliness**
  - Work with GoI (National, Provincial, and Municipal) to develop budget processes and budgets that are complementary and for IRAQI needs
  - Work with DoS to adjust either ESF or QRF regulations to mirror flexibility of CERP
- ✧ **Force Drawdown may provide a perceived window of opportunity for AQI resurgence; GoI must be perceived to be bringing the Sunni minority back in the mainstream of IRAQI society**
  - Increased emphasis on national reconciliation/reform de-Baathification law
  - Engage GoI for provincial elections NLT summer 08
  - Monitor the commitments and build on the successes of ANBAR Forum II
- ✧ **Replacement of BCT (five maneuver battalions, Brigade Troops Battalion and Brigade Support Battalion) with a Non-standard Headquarters and shifting the BCT's tasks and AO to an RCT without any other increase in capability risks RCTs ability to provide requisite support to coalition forces.**
  - Non-standard HQ come with coalition SECFOR for CAMP RAMADI (250 X SM) and for State Dept personnel in RAMADI area (PRT/ePRT) if private contractors are not authorized
  - Non-standard HQ come with coalition to support sustainment of small dispersed coalition and potentially DoS elements (Transition Teams, PRT) located throughout RAMADI area.

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MND-B: Risk

- ✧ **Significant impact on Sadr City JSS expansion; incur risk in other security districts to retain**
  - Reduce number of JSS's relative to MND-B projected troop levels
- ✧ **Loss of 2/82 ABN in February compels MND-B re-posturing as early as December**
  - Set conditions with IZ transfer to JASG and early decisions on departure dates of combat power (2/82ABN, 2 SCR) IOT effectively orient units during upcoming BCT RIP/TOA's (avoidance of future double-RIPs)
- ✧ **Redrawing boundaries with MND-N cedes Baghdad provincial areas, directly impacting ability to gain synergy across multiple LOOs and transition to Phase III**
  - Close cross boundary coordination of ISF, governance and essential services LOOs IOT enhance CF effectiveness across Baghdad Province.
- ✧ **Emphasis on transitioning responsibility to ISF based on time rather than conditions while simultaneously drawing down coalition forces, limits ability to maintain FAQ security gains in the event of ISF regression**
  - Immediate bolstering of partnership opportunities and selective Phase III transition to reduce risk associated with a loss of CF (Maximum Partnership, Intermediate Engagement and Minimum Engagement methodology).
- ✧ **Departure of 2SCR to backfill 4/2SBCT requires regeneration of strike force and OPRES and alternate sourcing of Sadr City JSS expansion**
  - Requires MNC-I assistance to mitigate a further loss of combat power in MND-B (2/82 ABN, 2 SCR, and three additional battalions).


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MND-C: Risk

- ✧ **Loss of Georgian Brigade w/o backfill as well as Fires Brigade HQ (-) conducting a non-standard mission jeopardizes security and engagement operations in Wasit (unless RFF approved for Non-Standard Brigade HQ; does not address loss of Georgian Brigade)**
  - Partner with IA at checkpoints
  - MITT the 3GB/1GB with 3/8 IA IOT prepare to transfer checkpoints to IA
- ✧ **Limited ability to interdict / disrupt weapons and personnel traffic from Madai'n and Wasit**
  - Close cross boundary coordination of ISF, governance and essential services
  - LOOs IOT enhance CF effectiveness across provinces
- ✧ **Responsiveness of Army air support for MND-C is degraded after departure of 3CAB (beginning Jul 08)**
  - Develop Army air support plan with MND-B for supporting MND-C
- ✧ **Possibility of JSS and COP closures**
  - Reduce number of JSS's relative to MND-C projected troop levels
- ✧ **Loss of BCT(-) reduces MND-C reach into Shia south provinces**
  - Develop 8<sup>th</sup> IA and IP SWAT capabilities for operations in key southern cities

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MND-CS: *Risk* 

- ⚠ ***Decreased presence of CF along provincial borders could trigger increased traffic of weapons and personnel***
- ⚠ ***Drawdown of CF may embolden JAM / BADR to regroup and conduct renewed attacks in MND-CS***

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MND-SE: *Risk* 


- ✧ ***Ability of the ISF to control the Security situation: increasing over time but still a risk.***
- ✧ ***Re-intervention threshold post PIC: needs defining***
- ✧ 


1.4b, 1.4d
- ✧ ***CJSOTF & other SOF operations require careful ROE and coordination in PIC provinces.***
- ✧ ***Future reductions in MND(SE) force levels: ability to respond to spike in violence post mid 08.***

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**MNC-I: Operational Risk** 

- ✧ *GOI fails to capitalize on opportunity created by FAQ security gains*
- ✧ *ISF does not control and retain areas that have been cleared*
- ✧ *Balancing resources between security districts, Baghdad belts, and outlying areas to mitigate tactical risks*
- ✧ *Rate of ISF force generation too slow to fill security requirements created by departure of CF forces*
- ✧ *ISF force generation exceeds resources available to develop them*
- ✧ *As GOI / Provincial autonomy increases, CF influence decreases*
- ✧ *Proper allocation of resources to protecting the populace and to developing the ISF*

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
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
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**MNC-I PSTA Tracking Chart**

Province / Capital	MND & GOV	MNC-I CG	JCTSR	MCNS	PIC
Muthanna / Samawah	May 06	Yes	Yes	Yes	Jul 06
Dhi Qar / Nasirayah	Jul 06	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sep 06
An Najaf / Najaf	Nov 06	Yes	Yes	Yes	Dec 06
Maysan / Al Amarah	Mar 07	Yes	Yes	Yes	Apr 07
Dahuk / Dahuk	Oct 06	Yes	Yes	Yes	May 07
Irbil / Irbil	Oct 06	Yes	Yes	Yes	May 07
Sulaymaniyah / Sulaymaniyah	Oct 06	Yes	Yes	Yes	May 07
Karbala / Karbala	Jul 07	Aug 07	Yes	Yes	Oct 07
Babil / Hilla	Jul 07	Aug 07	---	---	Dec 07
Basra / Basra	Sep 07	Dec 07	---	---	Dec 07
Qadisiyah / Diwaniyah	Dec 07	Dec 07	---	---	Jan 08
Ninawa / Mosul	Aug 07	Jan 08 (Nov 07)	---	---	Feb 08
Wasit / Al Kut	Jan 08 (Nov 07)	Jan 08 (Dec 07)	---	---	Feb 08
Al Anbar / Ramadi	Mar 08	Mar 08	---	---	Apr 08
Diyala / Baqubah	Jan 08	Apr 08	---	---	May 08
Salah Ah Din / Tikrit	May 08	May 08	---	---	Jun 08
Baghdad / Baghdad	Feb 08	May 08	---	---	Jun 08
Kirkuk / Kirkuk	Jan 08	NET Article 140 Resolution	---	---	NET Art. 140 res.

**Legend**

Province / Capital

Current (Prior)

PIC

Meets Conditions

Partially Meets Conditions

Does Not Meet Conditions

MNC-I Effects Assessment Cell  
DSN (b)(6)

Date to Meet Conditions Date to Meet Conditions

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Ceremony Date **131**  
As of 6 Oct 07

Sir,

This is a new chart for tracking PIC progress through the five key stages in the process.

The dates for Division and Corps level are projected dates when the province will meet the conditions for PIC.


The date on the far right hand column is the projected PIC date.



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## PSTA Conditions for Transfer

(What does **GREEN** mean?)



---

**MNF-I Forces**

**BLUF:** MNF-I able to support with QRFs, has freedom of movement, and can conduct counterterrorism operations

- MNF-I maintains adequate QRFs in close proximity to province
- PJCC able to link security forces with construction activities
- Provides support and force protection for MNF-I forces in area
- MNF-I retains freedom of movement & capability to conduct counterterrorism ops
- Conditions and implementing document agreed on by MNF-I, MOI, MOD, and provincial officials

**Threat Activity**

**BLUF:** UE activity level at which ISF can maintain internal security

- Terrorist/insurgent threat is low
- Terrorist/insurgent threat steady or downward trend
- Border threat is low
- Crime assessment does not materially impact the above
- Armed groups do not materially impact the above
- Infrastructure and LOC threat low
- Weapons turn in program established


**MND CDR**  
**Overall**  
**Assessment**

**Professional Military Judgment.**

**Iraqi Security Forces**

**BLUF:** IPS, IA, DBE, & NP at ORA 2

- IPS at ORA 2 capable of maintaining domestic order
- IPS coordinate COIN and share intel with IA and NP
- DBE at ORA 2 able to interdict cross-border support to AIF with support from IA
- NP at ORA 2 conducts COIN operations w/ support from MNF-I
- IA coordinates with IPS when leading COIN operations
- IA at ORA 2 contains the insurgency, coordinates ops with IPS, and can coordinate for MNF-I reaction forces
- PJCC and IA C<sup>2</sup> centers equipped, staffed, maintained, can respond to IPS assistance requests
- PJCC and IA C<sup>2</sup> centers coordinate security of critical infrastructure
- BDE level temporary detention capability under Iraqi control IAW Iraq's constitution, laws, & international obligations



**Governance**

**BLUF:** Governor oversees security operations and criminal justice system is operating

- The Governor, as PSC coordinator, oversees security operations in province
- PJCC, PSC, and Joint Operations Room operational – monitoring and coordinating ops
- Provincial C<sup>2</sup> nodes effectively share intelligence and coordinate capabilities with MOI and MOD
- Provincial systems for detention, trial, and incarceration under Iraqi control IAW Iraq's constitution, laws, & international obligations

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Sir,

This is a summary of conditions that inform your recommendation for or against PIC.



Threat: AIF activity level at which ISF can maintain internal security

ISF: IPS, IA, DBE, & NP at TRA 2

Governance: Governor oversees security operations and criminal justice system is operating

MNF-I: able to support with QRFs, has freedom of movement, and can conduct counterterrorism operations



<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;">  <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del></p> <h2>Changes in the OE corresponding with PIC</h2> <p>(1 of 2)</p> </div>  </div>	
Pre-PIC	Post-PIC
MND or MNF-W CG has overall responsibility for security in the province.	Governor and Provincial Security Committee (PSC) has overall responsibility for security in the province (or Operations Command)
CF has freedom of operations.	CF required to coordinate Counter Terrorism operations anywhere in province with Iraqi PM prior to execution (para 4f, Implementing Arrangement)
CF required to coordinate for coalition operations in IA Battlespace with IA Unit CDR.	CF lead CDR for operation is required to coordinate coalition operations with the Governor and the PSC and to liaise with the PJCC. MNF-I is also required to coordinate the operation with the Iraqi PM
IA unit at ORA I = CF in operational overwatch, otherwise CF in tactical overwatch. Definitions per reference c.	IA unit ORA I = CF in operational overwatch; IA unit under IGFC in a PIC province = CF in operational overwatch. Definitions per reference c.
Various means of security coordination. Limited or no intelligence fusion taking place between CF, IA, IP, and NP.	Specified security coordination process. PSC is responsible for planning, coordinating, and monitoring security operations in the province.
CF maintains lines of communication	14c CF lines of communication are limited and negotiated in the PIC MOU
CF provide necessary CSS to develop IA units to achieve IAL	CF gradually withdraw CSS until only emergency CSS is provided to IA units

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR~~

133



~~SECRET//REL to USA and ISG/HMIR~~

## Changes in the OE corresponding with PIC (2 of 2)


Pre-PIC	Post-PIC
ISF is in the lead in increasing numbers of areas throughout the province.	Remaining ISF units increasingly assume the lead until ISF is in the lead throughout the province.
IP provide security in populated areas with heavy IA and CF support.	IP are capable of providing security independently and coordinating with IA and/or CF support if necessary.
IA conducting security operations throughout province, including heavy support to the IP to secure population centers.	IA shifts to primarily conducting operations in rural areas and interdicting AIF LOCs, while postured to support IP in the cities as requested.
CF in tactical overwatch over IA units with a gradual shift to operational overwatch	CF gradually completes transition to operational overwatch for all IA units
Gradual transition of CF to the urban periphery	Continued transition of CF to the urban periphery
MoD and MoI builds logistical systems to support their forces	MoD and MoI continue building logistical systems while eventually not requiring US assistance on day to day operations
CF providing enabler support to ISF units in emergency conditions	Gradually withdraw enabler support until it is provided to ISF in emergency conditions only, some enablers not at all
BTs, POETs, BSTs; DBE Bde interdicting illegal traffic bypassing POEs; increasing Iraqi lead	Increasing Iraqi independence in border security ops
MOI secures the borders at the national level, requesting assistance as needed.	MOI secures the borders at the national level, requesting assistance as needed.
As CF assume a reduced presence QRFs response times gradually increase	Longer response time for CF QRFs

~~SECRET//REL to USA and ISG/HMIR~~

134

**Retrograde paths from a closing base generally trace to the closest COB and/or Regional COS**

**Asset/waste retrograde matrix provides dispositional guidance to camp mayors**



<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF/WR</del>		Non-organic BCT Enablers	
A	Maneuver	+	Intelligence
	• Civil Affairs Company		• <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">b 3 50 USC 3605</span>
	Firepower		• <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">1.4c</span> (Contractor)
	• Tactical PSYOP Detachment		• Document Exploitation Team (DOEX)
	• COMCAM		• Interrogator Support Teams (Contractor)
	• Electronic Warfare Officers (JCCS-1)		• SIGINT Terminal Guidance (STG) Teams
A	Sustainment / Medical	+	• Linguists
	• NONE		Interagency
A	Communications		• ePRT
	• NONE		• IQATF
A	Protection		
	• EOD Company		
	• <span style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 0 20px;">1.4c</span>		
		<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF/WR</del>	


Approved for Release

<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF/MPR</del>		Non-organic DIVISION Enablers	
▲	Maneuver	▲	Intelligence
	• Civil Affairs Battalion		• Crisis Operations Liaison Team (COLT)
▲	Firepower		• Organization of Regional Assessments Advisors
	• Fires BDE HQ		• 14c
	• PSYOP Company HQ (with PSYOP development detachment)		• Law Enforcement Program Team
	• COMCAM		• Document Exploitation Team (DOCEX)
	• Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD)		• Linguists
	• Expeditionary Air Support Operation Squadron (EASOS)	▲	Interagency
	• Electronic Warfare Officers and Field Site Leaders (JCCS-1)		• pPRT
	• EAD Radars (Q36)		• IQATF
▲	Sustainment / Medical	▲	Other
	• NONE		• Weather Detachment
▲	Communications		• Ministry Support Team
	• NONE		
▲	Protection		
	• EOD Battalion HQ		
	• 14c		
	• Military Police Battalion		
	• Military Police Companies		
	• Military Working Dog Teams		
	• Military Police Augmentation Team		
	• Horizontal Engineer Companies		
	• Vertical Engineer Companies		
	• Route Clearance Companies		
		<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF/MPR</del>	

<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF/WR</del>		Non-organic CORPS Enablers
Maneuver		Intelligence
• Civil Affairs Brigade		• Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) LNO
• CAB		• (b)(3) 50 USC 3605
Response		• Command LMS Element (CLE)
• PSYOP TF HQ		• Hunter Go-Co Line
• COMCAM		• AirScan Lines
• IO Field Support team		• Media Exploitation Cell (MET)
• MLRS Battery		• CI FO HQ (3 SM)
• CRAM (2xS&W BTRY & 2xIntercept BTRY)		• CI Det (12 SM)
• EASOG		• Task Force 14a
• Public Affairs Detachment (PAD)		• 3444 Category 1 Linguists
• Assessment Cell		• 357 Category 1 Linguists [OSD]
• Sentinel Platoon		• 589 Category 2 Linguists
• Avenger Battery		• 88 Category 3 Linguists
• JCCS-1 (EW HQ)		• JIDC (TF 134)
Protection		(b)(3) 50 USC 3605
• JIEDDO Cell		• COMTECH TM (MNF-I SPTs MNC-I)
• Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell		• CM Team (MNF-I SPTs MNC-I)
• 1 C-IED CJTF HQ (EOD Group)		• GOI Vetting Team (MNF-I SPTs MNC-I)
• Technical Escort Unit		• Strategic Intelligence Team (MNC/F-I)
• CBRN Platoons		Sustainment / Medical
• MP Battalions		• Level III Hospital
• Military Working Dog Teams		• Forward Surgical Team (FST)
• Law and Order Detachments		• Multi-Functional Medical Battalion
• Cadaver Dog Teams		• Combat Stress Company
• Horizontal Engineer Companies		• Combat Stress Detachment
• Vertical Engineer Companies		• Area Support Medical Company
• Route Clearance Companies		• Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC)
• Facility Engineer Detachments		Communications
• Utility Detachments		• NONE
• Topographic Company		Interagency
• Multi-role Bridge Companies		• IQATF
• Prime Power Unit		
• Construction Management Section		
		<del>SECRET//REL to USA, MCF/WR</del>








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Central Issue Facilities are located at LSAA and Baghdad and provide direct exchange for CIF items managed by 316<sup>th</sup> ESC






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(IF ALL LOCATIONS POP IN)


Sir, there are currently 10 distribution Nodes arrayed across the ITO which provide distribution support. There are 7 JDC Yards, 7 CRSP Yards, 3 A/DACGs and 1 FRP yard.

Next slide please.

(IF Animation by MND) :

\*Brief by location...






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\*Brief by location...



In MND-N: The five locations highlighted are manned by \_78\_ Army personnel and \_115\_ KBR workers.

In LSAA: The MCB and MCTs are comprised of \_150\_ personnel, with \_128\_ KBR movement control personnel.

In MNF-W: There are \_59\_ Army personnel and \_69\_ KBR personnel executing their missions.

In MND-SE, CS and C: The five locations are comprised of \_125\_ Army personnel and \_67\_ KBR Personnel.


In MND-B: MCTs are manned by \_139\_ Army personnel and \_77\_ KBR workers.

Currently, the 719th Movement Control Battalion commands 23 MCTs with 514 military personnel.

Through Task Order 139, KBR is authorized 487 Log Coordinator "Spaces" with 456 "Faces" filling positions currently.

Total Movement Control personnel in the Iraq Theater are 1110.





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
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
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This slide depicts where the HQ element of each maint company resides. These maint companies provide an expeditionary capability through MSTs which can go places where KBR will not. This gives the MND commander flexibility throughout their OE.


In addition to Base Maint and MST's these units provide: M1114/FRAG 5 TOTALS  
BALAD: (213) BIAP: (163) RAMADI: (74) SPEICHER: (62)  
MOSUL : (52) KIRKUK: (19) TAJI: (46) AL ASAD: (5) TALIL: (23) Q-WEST: (15)  
M1151/FRAG 5 TOTALS BALAD: (28)





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#### REQUIREMENTS

- 1 x CSA (1 x OD Co) LSA Anaconda (213 ASG)
- 4 x ASPs (3 x ML PLTs)
  - MND-N (Q-West ASP) (3 SB)
  - MND-W (TQ ASP) (507 CSG)
  - MND-CS (Adder ASP) (82 SB)
  - MND-B (Liberty ASP) (15 SB)
- 15 x ATHPs (1 section, 12 SMs)

#### CAPABILITIES

- Each (DS) PLT: 1 ASP
- Each ASP R/I/S: 843 S/T per day
- Total Storage: 7,000 S/T

#### Each (DS) CO (CSA)


- CSA R/I/S: 2400 S/T per day
- CSA ASP Total Storage: 25000 S/T

#### THROUGHPUT

- 100% of call forward CL V to IZ ASPs is ground containerized
- TSA pushes requested CL V to LSAA; LSAA pushes to ASPs
- Munitions are supplied from five storage areas in Iraq

Authorized levels & unit prioritization established by MNC-I as reported through MUREP  
Munitions pushed from Theater to CSA / ASPs and from CSA to ASPs and unit ATHPs





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
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


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


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
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












#### Key Task:

Provide religious support

Perform religious worship services, religious education, and pastoral counseling for TT in IA sector

Advise the CDR on matters pertaining to religion and morals and morale as affected by religion


Advise the CDR on the impact of indigenous religious practices, as required

Ensure the free exercise of religion and coordination of religious coverage for all faith groups

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URRFS DO NOT HAVE TO BE ON SLIDE (BUT SHOULD BE LISTED IN NOTES AT LEAST)

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
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Pages 303 through 305 redacted for the following reasons:

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(b)(5)  
(b)(5), (b)(3), (b)(6)



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In 2009 assuming rotations will be only 12 months the window of transition remains in roughly the same location as a second opportunity to implement an advisory BDE.

The same decision cycle previously described remains in effect with the potential to again delay the decision until 2010.

<div>  <div>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MPR</div> <div>METT-TC Triggers to Determine Coverage</div>  </div>			
<div> <b>OPORD 07-01</b>            MSC's tailor their level of ISF support according to the following factors:  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local conditions</li> <li>• Capability of ISF units</li> <li>• Size of operational area</li> <li>• Capabilities of CF</li> </ul> </div>	<div> <b>Situation</b>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enemy               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Recent attack trends</li> <li>- External influences</li> <li>- Sectarian Violence</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Iraqi Infrastructure               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Effectiveness of local Government</li> <li>- PIC Status</li> <li>- Population centers</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </div>	<div> <b>ISF Operational Effectiveness</b>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IAIDBEINPIIP</li> <li>• ORA Level</li> <li>• Manning (Officer/NCO)</li> <li>• Logistic Capability</li> <li>• Equipment</li> <li>• Sectarian motives</li> </ul> </div>	
	<div> <b>Coalition Forces</b>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enablers               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Maneuver units available</li> <li>- Logistic asset availability</li> <li>- Combat multipliers</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Command and Control               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Distance between units</li> <li>- Communication between units</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </div>	<div> <b>Quick Reaction Forces</b>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• QRF               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Size/Type – Ground &amp; Air</li> <li>- Response time to units in sector</li> </ul> </li> <li>• MEDEVAC               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Coverage of AO</li> <li>- Response time to units in sector</li> <li>- Distance to Medical Facilities</li> </ul> </li> </ul> </div>	
<div> <div>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MPR</div> <div>162</div> </div>			

Sir, these are the filters we considered when we were determining which models we used in each AO.

Basically these were an expansion on the same criteria used in 07-01.




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Sir, I know (b)(6) will brief a series of major tasks by phase and it addresses partnering as its own phase.

What we are trying to highlight here is that the level of oversight should not dictate partnering and we see partnering occurring across all phases and to list it as its own phase may be misleading.

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MB~~

**BN Partnership**

<b>IAG External MiTT</b>		<b>BN Partnership</b>		<b>Security Platoon</b>	
Team Chief	MAJ	Team Chief	MAJ	Platoon leader	1LT
Logistics Trainer	MAJ	NCOIC	MSG	Gunner	SGT
Intelligence Trainer	MAJ	S2 Trainer	O3	Driver	PVT-SPC
Fires/Effects Trainer	CPT	S2 Trainer NCO	MSG	Rifle Man	PVT-SPC
HSC Trainer	CPT	S3 Trainer	CPT	Interp	CIV
Maneuver Trainer	CPT	S3 NCO Trainer	SSG	Platoon Sergeant	SFC
Communications NCO	SFC(P)	S4 Trainer	CPT	Gunner	PVT-SPC
Fires/Effects NCO	SFC	S4 NCO Trainer	MSG	Driver	PVT-SPC
Intelligence NCO	SFC	S5 Trainer	SSG	Rifle Man	PVT-SPC
Medic	SSG	S6 NCO Trainer	SSG	Medic	PVT-SPC
Logistics NCO	SSG	Medical Trainer	SGT	Squad Leader	SSG
		BOC RTO Day	PVT-SPC	Gunner	PVT-SPC
		BOC RTO Day	PVT-SPC	Driver	PVT-SPC
		Fires Trainer	CPT	Rifle Man	PVT-SPC
		Fires Trainer	SFC	Rifleman	PVT-SPC
		TNG NCO	SGT	Squad Leader	SSG
		NBC NCO	SGT	Gunner	PVT-SPC
		Armorer	SGT	Driver	PVT-SPC
				Rifle Man	PVT-SPC
				Rifleman	PVT-SPC

vs. +

**External vs. Partnered**  
11 pax vs. 38 pax

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Sir this final slide is simply an example of what 2-15 FA is using in their BN partnership model.

We show this simply as an example of what an enhanced team could look like.

Reality is the enhanced team would not be this rank heavy but this gives a feel for what one may look like.

Sir, subject to you questions I will be followed by basing.




 ~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFMIR~~ 

Conditions by Phase – Partnering



**MNF-I Description:** CF and ISF together plan, train and execute COIN operations to protect the population. Each force conducts some independent operations where and when necessary. CF continue to provide enablers while ISF develop its own capability, particularly in the area of sustainment.

CF transition from Leading to Partnering when the following conditions are met in a given area:

- Local ISF are able to conduct combined operations with CF

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*Conditions by Phase – Tactical Overwatch*



**MNF-I Description:** CF provide a QRF and the majority of essential enablers for ISF units, which are capable of independently planning and executing COIN operations within their assigned AOs. Essential enablers include: mobility support, joint fires, ISR systems and intelligence linkage, air MEDEVAC, Level II/III medical, long range C2 communications and emergency sustainment.

CF transition from Partnering to Tactical Overwatch when the following conditions are met in a given area:

- *ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with Coalition enabler support*
- *ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population*
- *Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning*
- *Essential services are provided on an equitable basis*

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*Conditions by Phase – Operational Overwatch*


**MNF-I Description:** CF provide an operational reserve to reinforce ISF QRFs in order to sustain ISF's ability to independently plan, execute and sustain COIN operations. CF may also provide specific enablers to assist ISF operations and ensure operational success, such as joint fires, air MEDEVAC, ISR systems and intelligence linkage.


CF transition from Tactical Overwatch to Operational Overwatch when the following conditions are met in a given area:

- *ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with limited Coalition enabler support*
- *ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable)*
- *Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability*
- *Essential services are provided on an equitable and consistent basis*
- *Sufficient sustainable employment opportunities are available*
- *Sustainable local economic development is ongoing*

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Conditions by Phase – Strategic Overwatch



**MNF-I Description:** CF position units to deter external threats, support CT operations and provide a strategic reserve to allow the ISF to provide security for the nation of Iraq as they focus on COIN, CT, routine policing and border security operations. CF will provide limited enabler support such as joint fires, ISR systems and intelligence linkage. Relationship becomes one of security assistance as part of an alliance described in a long term security agreement.

CF transition from Operational Overwatch to Strategic Overwatch when the following conditions are met in a given area:

- *ISF responsible for security in the local area are able to conduct independent operations with generally no Coalition enabler support*
- *ISF operational effectiveness and reliability are sufficient to protect the local population, protect critical infrastructure in the local area, and secure border areas (if applicable)*
- *Local governing mechanisms are in place and functioning; vertical and horizontal linkages are established and serve to reinforce local stability*
- *Essential services are provided on an equitable and consistent basis*
- *Sufficient sustainable employment opportunities are available*
- *Sustainable local economic development is ongoing*

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 <del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del>		<i>Population Security</i> 			
<i>Sub-Tasks by Major Task (1 of 9)</i>					
Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch	
▲					Establish continuous presence in Iraqi neighborhoods
▲					Identify and remove local enemy leadership and infrastructure
▲					Implement population control measures
▲					Establish and man JSSs and COPs
▲					Conduct cordon-and-search operations
▲					Conduct cordon-and-knock operations
▲					Establish and man temporary checkpoints
▲					Conduct patrolling
▲					Conduct interdiction ambushes

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 <del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCEI/MR</del>		<i>Infrastructure Security</i> 		
<i>Sub-Tasks by Major Task (2 of 9)</i>				
Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch
▲ Perform fixed site security of critical infrastructure				
▲ Harden critical infrastructure				
▲ Secure infrastructure repair teams				
▲ Neutralize local groups that interdict critical power infrastructure				
▲ Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance of critical infrastructure				
▲ Conduct show-of-force in the vicinity of critical infrastructure				
▲ Disrupt black market and oil smuggling activity				

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 <del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MR</del>		<i>Border Security</i> 		
<b>Sub-Tasks by Major Task (3 of 9)</b>				
Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch
	<b>Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance of likely infiltration routes</b>			
	<b>Monitor POEs</b>			
	1.4b, 1.4d			
				

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## Engagement



## Leading

### Tactical Overwatch

### Operational Overwatch


## Strategic Overwatch

**Conduct engagement to improve horizontal and vertical linkages in Iraqi political and security institutions**

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Strike Operations





Sub-Tasks by Major Task (7 of 9)

Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch
▲ Neutralize groups that attack security forces or intimidate the population				
▲ Disrupt EJK networks				
▲ Neutralize VBIED networks				
▲ 1.4b, 1.4d				
▲ Neutralize terrorist or extremist networks, such as AQAM				
▲ 1.4c				
▲ Kill or capture HVIs				
▲ Conduct show-of-force				

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<div><div></div><div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP</del></div><div></div></div> <div>Information Operations and Public Affairs</div>					
Sub-Tasks by Major Task (8 of 9)					
Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch	
▲ Conduct PSYOP					
▲ Conduct electronic warfare					
▲ Conduct computer network operations			Working		
▲ Conduct public affairs planning					
▲ Facilitate media operations					
▲ Maintain positive relations with local civilian communities					
▲ Conduct combat camera operations					
<div><div><del>SECRET//REL to USA and MCF/MP</del></div><div>180</div></div>					



**Force Protection**


**Sub-Tasks by Major Task (9 of 9)**

Leading	Partnering	Tactical Overwatch	Operational Overwatch	Strategic Overwatch
▲ Neutralize IED, EFP, and IDF networks				
▲ Conduct route reconnaissance and route security				
▲ Conduct route clearance				
▲ Provide convoy security				
▲ Conduct base security				
▲ Provide security for USM-I personnel				
▲ Secure transition teams and PRTs				
▲ Provide QRF for Coalition elements operating in AO				
▲ Conduct personnel recovery				
▲ Provide MEDEVAC				
▲ Conduct counter-rocket and counter-mortar fire				
▲ Provide joint fires				
▲ Conduct bridge and route repair				
▲ Provide security for UNAMI operations				

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3/25 and 1/10 MTN will be the next Brigade to RIP/TOA. Two things to  
on this RIP. First, as we laid out for you Monday night 1/10 MTN is a  
candidate for sourcing the TF 1.4a mission in January so long as we remain  
0 BCTs. If General Mixon decides to pull a battalion from 1/10 MTN that  
preclude detaching a battalion from this Brigade to reinforce 3/1 CD in  
la. The remaining battalions should replace 3/25 IDs battalions one-for-





Sir, this chart represents the conclusion or endstate of our reduction in force from 20 to 15 BCTs. We assume that we will have non-standard Brigade headquarters in Anbar and Wasit Provinces and a non-standard division headquarters in MND-C. We also assume that the new embassy move will be complete with the JASG HQ providing security for the IZ. The dotted line north of the IZ gives you flexibility that if conditions warrant we could reposition combat power that is currently providing security on Haifa Street.